Today Louise Elperding and Roger Rubin, the graphologists we commissioned to analyze the Madoffs' handwriting, discuss the meaning behind Ruth's loops and flourishes.

"Ruth Madoff's large and relatively legible signature presents a smooth, superficially sociable facade. On first glance, the writing appears rather pleasant and conventional. Only closer examination betrays a complicated woman rife with contradictions.

"The initials R and M are outsized and somewhat embellished, which might be seen as a narissistic but ingratiating gesture. Though the forms are conventional, they reflect a mask of artifice. They reside almost exclusively in the middle zone [note the low t-stem and h-stem as well as the short upper extension of the fs] which when present in combination suggest self-centered ego demands.

"Furthermore the appearance of a confident social facade begins to give way to a more ambivalent picture. The initial R hitches at the top, and then the down stroke bows, as if resisting forwards motion and, symbolically speaking, the future. The constricted a, d, and o may reveal not merely emotional reserve but callousness and controlled indifference. The stunted t, h, and fs may have originally been seen as simply self-involvement also presenting a more troubling interpretation: they are avoidance of the upper zone, the zone of common values and ideals. The loop at the signature's conclusion is like a protective wall against interaction with others."

In Catastrophe: The Story of Bernard L. Madoff, The Man Who Swindled the World, we gave readers insight into the Ponzi King's possible mental state by a specialist in the field of personality disorders.

Then, in a series of post-publication blogs on this website, we discussed Bernie's possible mind-set with a self-acknowledged, unrepentant white collar criminal.

Now, as Bernie gets ready to don his bullet-proof vest in preparation for Thursday's court appearance, here's the skinny on his, and Ruth's, handwriting, as obtained from a court document and commissioned from prominent handwriting analysts Louise Erpelding and Roger Rubin.

In agreeing to share their analysis with us, however, Erpelding and Rubin offer one caveat: "Graphologists ordinarily prefer not to interpret solely on a signature without a further sample of the person's writing as the signature represents only the most 'public' aspect of an individual and may be at variance with the totality of the writer's character."

That said, here's their take on Bernie's "John Hancock":

"First of all, Bernard Madoff's signature is illegible. Although illegibility per se may not be negative, it does suggest a willingness to appear hidden, opaque, and inscrutable. Futhermore, what looks at first glance like a wanton scribbling is in fact a controlled pattern of movement that is repeated in both signatures and suggests a conscious methodology of deceit.

"The linear movement does not proceed in an orderly direction or at an even pace, which suggests the writer goes his own way and no one else's. The writing path is difficult to follow, which suggests that the writer wishes his image to remain obscure, as well as that his actions may be covert. Finally, the overall impression is that the signature is obliterated, which may be interpreted as a combination of self-concealment and/or self-abnegation.

"Graphologists consider the manner in which letters are connected to be particularly revealing. It represents, among other things, the manner in which the writer relates with others. In Bernard Madoff's signature, the indistinct forms are strung together by an unstable 'thread.' The customary social contract is ignored. The thread connection is an ambiguous manner of proceeding, and may manifest variously as creative problem solving; evasion of a real decision; self-protecting maneuvering; mimicry of attitudes, opinions and behavior from his milieu; political accomodation; or, if degenerated further, psychopathology or criminality."

Log on tomorrow for Erpelding & Rubin's take on the Missus's signature. 

Ira Sorkin, Bernie Madoff's miracle-making attorney--he has kept Bernie out of jail since December 11--is now asking the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to allow another of his clients, none other than Bernie's Missus, to retain the $45 million in municipal bonds she holds with Cohmad Securities, an entity owned in part by Bernie, with offices surprise, surprise, in the Lipstick Building, as well as the cash vested in her $17 million Wachovia account.

Sorkin has not informed the court as to how Ruth could have accumulated her $62 million cache--a tidy sum that does not include the Madoff's East 64th Street duplex, valued for the purposes of Bernie's bail at $7 million and held in her name.

Let us recall that in November and December Ruth made withdrawals totaling $15.5 million from her Cohmad account, the last being $10 million just before her husband's arrest.

Should the court grant Sorkin's request, Ruth will be sitting on a $69 million fortune--not bad for a kid from Queens who, apart from sharing in Bernie's ill-gotten gains, is not known to have amassed any real money save for her advance for co-authoring a cookbook.

Given that book adances for relatively unknown cookbook writers were relatively modest even before the publishing industry tanked, Chef Ruth would have had to have come up with a real spicy meatball of a tome to have earned those millions.

Is it possible, even in this jaded, troubled society that Ruth will be allowed to keep her fortune--garnered, obviously, via Bernie's criminal enterprise--as some of his victims struggle to pay for the bare necessities of life?

Justice may be blind. But it can't be that uncaring.

So why doesn't Judge Louis Stanton just tear up Sorkin's brief and run him out of his courtrrom for having had the chutzpah to make such a motion?

In our last posting, we mentioned that we were awaiting Baker & Hostetler's response concerning the process whereby the firm chose Eugene F. Collins Solicitors in Dublin, and Lovells LLP in London, to assist in Madoff-related activity in Ireland, the United Kingdom and on the European continent.

Having not yet received a response from Baker & Hostetler, we decided to send e-mails and/or to telephone the retained firms directly.

To that end, on Wednesday we called and left a message for David Cantrell, the managing partner of Eugene Collins, following up yesterday with an e-mail.

We also called Lovells, where we spoke briefly to Joe Bannister, a London-based partner with expertise, according to his biography, in "financial services insolvencies."

Responding to our query as to how Lovells had been selected by Baker & Hostetler, Bannister replied, "I'm not in a position to comment on Lovells' position in relation to that. Could I ask you to speak to Cary Kochberg please?"

Of course he could ask.

We then put in a call to Kochberg at Lovells' London office and were informed by his P.A. that he was in a meeting. Leaving our telephone number, we followed up with an e-mail. Calling again today, we were informed by Kochberg's P.A. that he was again in a meeting.

Was this the continuation of yesterday's meeting?

It is increasingly clear that neither Baker & Hostetler nor the firms it has retained have any interest in answering questions regarding the process by which these firms were selected.

While this may be standard procedure in the world of high-profile law firms dealing with high stakes cases, neither the victims' nor the the publics' need to know exactly how Irving Picard and his counsel, Baker & Hostetler, operate, is being satisfied.

What is known is that Picard, Baker, Eugene Collins, Lovells, Lazard Freres and any other entity to be retained in the future will share--likely substantially--in the nearly $1 billion already recovered by Picard.

To date, neither Picard nor Baker & Hostetler--the firm he joined as a partner one week after the court awarded them their plums--has shown serious interest in transparency.

That does not bode well for Bernard Madoff's victims.

Our conversation with Sammy Antar, the former chief financial officer of Crazy Eddie, Inc., and self-confessed possessor of a criminal mind, is so far-ranging that we are sharing it with our web readers in installments.

In today's installment, Sammy tells about the "Fraud Triangle," which, as you will soon learn, actually has four sides!

"It was developed by criminologists trying to study white collar crime," Sammy explains. "The first element is incentive. You may think that money is the incentive for economic crime; money is a byproduct of it. There is always a spectrum of reasons for crime.

"People commit crimes for a whole host of reasons. In Madoff's case, it could have been sheer ego--he didn't want people to know he was a failure--and, of course, the byproduct was money. It could have been because he liked the stature of being successful--some people commit crimes to get in the sack with someone."

The second element:

"Opportunity; your code of ethics limits your behavior but it doesn't limit ours. In Madoff's case, that came from lack of checks and balances. lack of effective oversight by the SEC.

The third element:

"It's called 'rationalization'--the idea that criminals rationalize their crimes. In white collar crime you're dealing with a highly intelligent individual. Studies show that between ninety-two and ninety-six percent of white collar criminals have no prior criminal record. You can estimate that the higher the economic value of a white collar crime, the less likely that the person has a criminal record."

Now Sammy tells us that this "triangle" has a fourth element:

"Capability--the experts went beyond the triangle: to be capable you have to be intelligent, to be intelligent you have to know right from wrong. We look at our criminal behavior as being no different from what everyday people do. There's no moral differentiation. We enjoy doing the crime; it's challenging. And, of course, the money is good. But that doesn't mean that money is always the primary factor. I knew what I was doing. I enjoyed it. It was fun!

Our conversation with Sammy Antar, the former chief financial officer of Crazy Eddie, Inc., and self-confessed possessor of a criminal mind, is so far-ranging that we are sharing it with our web readers in installments.

In today's installment, Sammy explores the nature of Bernard Madoff's criminality while continuing to burnish his own credentials as an unrepentant bad guy.

"Was Bernie Madoff category one, like me, or [the less sinister seeming] category two? My guess is that he is probably category two," Sammy says. "We all live with criminal temptation every day: some people jaywalk. Of course, I'm not equating that with a large crime, but we all have our levels of temptation. Some of them don't rise to the level of criminality, as they do for me."

Now Sammy, who an hour ago ran ahead of us as we entered the coffee shop, excusing his gaffe by saying, "I'm hyper," and immediately on sitting down at our table downed a cup of Java, summons a waiter, politely asks for a refill, and continues his assessment of the Ponzi King: "I don't think Madoff started out to be a criminal," he theorizes. "I believe that he succumbed to temptation. He may have had a bad quarter or had borrowed from one person to pay the other."

Madoff's success at convincing seemingly savvy movers and shakers to invest with him:

"Madoff increased the comfort level by building a wall of false integrity around him. How did he do it? He donated to charities; he was a fiduciary to these charities by managing their money; he was even on the board of NASD. As a criminal, I did these sorts of things too."

All in the family:

"Look at why Madoff was successful. Madoff and his people shared common backgrounds, religion, and family loyalty, as do the Russian Mob, the Mafia, and our family of Crazy Eddie's. Those are the cohesive groups--the toughest groups to crack. I'm not saying the other family members were involved, but it was his family's cohesiveness that enabled him to be successful for a long period of time."

The con man's appeal for the rest of us:

"Most white collar criminals are charming, likeable people; that's why we're called 'confidence men'--we gain the confidence of our victims." Then, leaning mock-menacingly toward us again, Sammy adds, "We can pick your pocket as we are talking to you."

We criminal are different:

"What you have to understand is that you are dealing with an element of society that doesn't play by your rules: we are economic predators, no different than serial killers. The only difference is that we commit our crimes with a smile while serial killers do it with weapons. The effects of our crimes are just as brutal as violent crime.

"Madoff was almost the classic white collar criminal. He didn't kill twenty or thirty people, but you have fifty billion dollars in damages: he wiped out peoples homes, their life savings; there are probably thousands of people out of work as a result of his crime. He got caught in his old age and will probaby be dead by the time he goes to jail."

Log on tomorrow for the next installment of "Dinner with Sammy," his explanation of the "Fraud Triangle," criteria developed by criminologists to better understand what makes people like Bernie Madoff--and, of course, himself, tick.

Is Bernie Madoff a born criminal or an opportunist?

What motivates one possessed of a true criminal mind? Greed? The thrill of getting away with fraud? Conning innocent people? All of the above?

Once punished, can a born criminal become one of the good guys?

These are but a few of the questions we posed to Sam E. "Sammy" Antar, an extremely vocal, self-confessed possessor of a criminal mind, during a conversation on a cold evening last week in a midtown Manhattan coffee shop.

Sammy, the former chief financial officer of Crazy Eddie, Inc., was a mastermind, along with his cousin Eddie "Crazy Eddie" Antar and an uncle, Sam M. Antar, of one of the largest security frauds of their day, having cost investors hundreds of millions of dollars.

Becoming the government's key witness against his cousin and uncle in both the criminal and civil prosecutions, Sammy pled guilty to three felony counts and was sentenced to six months' house arrest, twelve hundred hours of community service and three years' probation, as well as being fined.

Our conversation with Sammy is so wide-ranging that we are sharing it with our web readers in installments.

"Dinner with Sammy," Part One

In today's installment, Sammy burnishes his own credentials as an unrepentant and confirmed bad guy.

"I solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, so help me God!" Sammy exclaims in mock gravity as he tucks into his dinner: a scoop of tuna surrounded by rings of green and red peppers and circles of Bermuda onion.

"Before we talk about Madoff, you have to understand that there are two types of criminals," he explains, "the one that plans to be a criminal and the one that when the opportunity presents itself becomes a criminal. I'm not going to say that one is better than the other; both are evil. I was the worst kind of criminal; I committed my crime simply because I could. I enjoyed it and if I'm not a criminal today, it's only because I got caught."

Cooperating with the Feds:

"The only reason that I cooperated with the United States government is because I didn't want to pick up a bar of soap and worry who my boyfriend was going to be; it just wasn't my style. I did not cooperate because I wanted to do the right thing; I did not cooperate because I believed in God; I did not cooperate because I found God; I did not cooperate for any moral or heroic reasons. The only reason I cooperated is because I got caught--most people cooperate because they got caught."

Rehab for criminals

"The zebra doesn't change its stripes. All of this sorrow, all of this morality, all of this redemption is baloney! I do free speaking engagements all over the country. I pay out of my own pocket. People often ask me if I'm redeemed. I say, 'Just because I do good deeds now that doesn't mean I'm redeemed.' When I was a criminal, I walked old ladies across the street too."

The criminal's attitude toward potential victims:

"The criminal considers your humanity as a weakness to be exploited in the execution of a crime," Sammy confides. Then, staring intently at us across the table, he drives his point home, observing, "You are being nice to me now, sitting down with me. You are having a code of ethics: you believe in innocence until being proven guilty, which is a wonderful thing. I'm not demeaning that. That just gives us the the initiative to commit our crimes."

Sammy's credo:

"Having consumed the mound of tuna at his plate's center, Sammy proceeds to systematically attack the surrounding rings of peppers and onions. Energized, he expands on his theme by invoking the late Ronald Reagan. "He said 'trust and verify.' I say, 'don't trust, just verify,' because when you give me your trust that gives me the initiative. Your code of ethics, your willingness to believe that today Sammy Antar may be a reformed felon; your willingness to sit down with me now, even though I was an economic predator, without checking your pockets"--here Sammy rather playfully leans toward us--"your innate trust limits your behavior and gives me the opportunity as a criminal to exploit it, because we measure our effectiveness by the comfort level of our victims. You can steal more with a smile than you can with a gun."

Log on tomorrow for the next installment of "Dinner with Sammy," his take on the nature of Bernie Madoff's criminality.

In perusing the New York State Supreme Court's website, we discover that Bernie Madoff's lead attorney, Ira Lee Sorkin, may himself land in court in the near future as a defendant in a malpractice suit filed by a former client.

So, Bernie, just as many of your erstwhile investors, lured by the amazing returns you were achieving, failed to perform due diligence concerning Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, it's obvious that such an investigation was not on your agenda when it came to engaging "Ike," as he likes to be called, to represent you.

Interested?

If so, we refer you to the New York State Supreme Court website, Index Number 603536-2006.

Yesterday we interviewed Douglas Berman, the William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law of The Ohio State University and the owner of the website, Sentencing Law and Policy. Professor Berman is one of the nation's leading authorities on federal sentencing.

Q. If Madoff pleads, rather than going to trial, what might the parameters of the sentence be?

DB: It depends on the nature and the terms of the plea agreement. First and foremost, it's inevitable that he will plead unless he and his lawyers cannot negotiate a tolerable outcome from their perspective. The evidence is so dramatic from his own admissions, and the public handwringing and the losses, particularly to prominent people who will not be eager to speak on his behalf, are so extreme that I cannot imagine that any lawyer representing Madoff would think that there would be a good outcome from going to trial rather than taking a plea.

I expect that the government would be comfortable with a plea agreement providing for multiple years in prison--even more than a decade in prison. That said, it is relatively rare for a first offender, no matter the scope of the fraud, to plead guilty and not be able to get a sentencing range below a decade. The most obvious example of that is Andrew Fastow, of the Enron scandal, who by all accounts was a scoundrel but was able to plead guilty in part because he was cooperating to give them other scoundrels and because he did plead guilty with a view toward his other family members.

Q. In plea negotiations, do the victims' comments or views play any role? And if a plea bargain were actually agreed to, would victims be allowed to make statements in court on sentencing day?

DB: Yes, and yes, although there is a bit of extra uncertainty here. There is a relatively new federal statute known as The Crime Victim's Rights Act of 2004, passed by Congress and signed by President George W. Bush, which provides for quite explicit safeguards for victims in having a role in this process.

What has not been resolved in the context of a case with such high profile victims is whether the prosecution and the defense can negotiate around those provisions. I presume, for many reasons, that neither the government nor Madoff's lawyers want to have a sentencing hearing where Steven Spielberg and other high profile victims vent their spleen or describe all of their projects that got demolished.

So my instinct is that, as part of the plea negotiations, there should be an effort to recognize the rights of victims, but also to make sure that the victims don't provide external disruption to what the parties think is the best way to get this done. The problem there is that that is the fundamental reason why Congress passed the act, that there was concern that in many cases, prosecutors and defense attorneys would have the incentive to cut victims out of the loop. Thus this could become an amazing test case for victims' rights, though for a variety of reasons everybody involved is very aware of these competing concerns and will try to come up with a sensible way to deal with both the difficulties and the legitimate rights that the victims may be inclined to bring up.

Q. What role will public opinion play in how the government looks at a plea agreement?

DB: In many respects, public opinion is not only a large part of what influences the Justice Department but a central part. There are both legitimate and illegitimate bases for that. One, of course, is that public opinion influences the perception of justice; there are lots of components of achieving justice that necessarily turn on how the public responds to the outcome.

The government is more than aware of how much P.R. this case gets, and more than aware that they can't make a deal which looks like: rich scoundrel gets off easy. The pernicious part is that it may preclude their ability to make what would be a very sensible deal in light of the evidence. It may be that because the press has been so bad and because Madoff is now Exhibit A of corporate greed and scandal that what would be a sensible deal in light of his age or his willingness to try to make restitution or whatever other arrangements he is willing to make, would unduly influence their willingness to accept what might be a just outcome.

My guess is that the public only cares about how many years Madoff will get and doesn't focus on whether he will serve time in a minimum or maximum security facility. The public is not going to care whether that facility is near to where Madoff's family and friends are, even though those factors are probably very important to Madoff. That's where there may be potential for a deal.

Q. If a plea agreement is not reached, what is your ballpark estimate as to when a trial could take place?

DB: After the indictment, it usually takes a year or more before even a relatively simple case goes to trial. In this case, if you add the extent to which it might be in Madoff's interest not to rush this trial, it could take longer than that.

That estimate is based on the assumption that they will spend considerable time well into 2009 trying to figure out whether a deal can come together, and there will be pressure from different sources to make that happen. Only if that were to blow up would we get moving toward a trial. It's often a long haul.